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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 11, 2009,just two months after the first cases of HIN1 (the Swine
Flu) were reported, Margaret Chan, the Director-General of the World Health
Organization (WHO) officially confirmed the news that many in the
international health community had feared. "Ladies and gentlemen," she
began, "The virus is entirely new. [It] is contagious, spreading easily from one
person to another, and from one country to another .... The world is now at
the start of the 2009 influenza pandemic."' Although health experts have long
predicted that the world would soon face another global health crisis, many
thought H5N1 (avian influenza) was the most likely candidate. Since it was
first discovered in 1997 that humans could be infected with the H5N 1 virus,
many industrialized nations have devoted considerable resources to developing
an effective vaccine, in hopes of minimizing the adverse consequences of a
future pandemic to their citizens.2 Now the same countries are scrambling to
inoculate their citizens against the Swine Flu.3 Unfortunately, many
developing countries do not have the same access to the Swine Flu vaccine and
have in effect been left to fend for themselves.4
The Swine Flu outbreak has renewed interest in the best way to protect the
world's population against pandemic influenza. The last time the issue made
international headlines was when Indonesia refused the World Health
Organization's request to share samples of avian influenza strains collected
from newly discovered outbreaks of the virus in 2007.' Indonesia's decision
Margaret Chan, Director-General of the World Health Organization, World Now at the
Start of 2009 Influenza Pandemic (June 11,2009), transcript available at http://www.who.int/
mediacentre/news/statements/2009/hlnl_pandemic_phase6_2009061 1/en/index.html.
2 Lawrence 0. Gostin & Benjamin E. Berkman, Preparing for Pandemic Influenza: Legal
and Ethical Challenges, in ETHICAL AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS IN MITIGATING PANDEMIC
DISEASE: WORKSHOP SUMMARY 78, 79 (Bd. on Global Health ed., 2007).
3 Jeanne Walden, Rich Nations Lock in Flu Vaccines as Poor Ones Fret, WALL ST. J.,
May 16, 2009, at A12.
' Donald G. McNeil Jr., Progress is Slow on Moving Surplus Swine Flu Vaccine to
Countries That Need It, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2010, at Al1.
' Dhrubajyoti Bhattacharya, An Exploration of Conceptual and Temporal Fallacies in
International Health Law and Promotion of Global Public Health Preparedness, 35 J.L. MED.
& ETHIcS 588, 588 (2007); see also Zakki Hakim, Poor Countries Battle WHO over BirdFlu,
DAILY DEMOCRAT, Mar. 26, 2007, available at http://www.indonesia-ottawa.org/information/
details.php?type--news-copy&id=3944 (quoting Health Minister Siti Fadilah Supari, stating
"[t]he [vaccine distribution] system places developing countries at [a] potential disadvantage[ ]
in terms of price, access and supply of vaccine .... The rules of the system must be changed").
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was a major departure from the WHO's virus-sharing protocol, where member
states share newly discovered viral strains with one another in order to assist
in the development of vaccines.6 The WHO relies on viral samples donated
from different member states to prepare seed strains that pharmaceutical
companies use to manufacture a variety of vaccines. Instead of following
international norms, Indonesia asserted "viral sovereignty," property rights
over the newly discovered H5N1 strains,8 and subsequently entered into
contractual negotiations for the samples with Baxter Healthcare, a large United
States-based pharmaceutical company.9 Under the contract with Baxter
Healthcare, Indonesia agreed to allow the company access to its H5N1 samples
in exchange for intellectual property rights and access to any vaccines
developed from the samples.'
Indonesia was concerned with the fact that developing countries often
freely share viral samples with the WHO and receive little to nothing in
return." Instead of rewarding developing nations for their valuable
contributions to global health initiatives, the WHO contracts with private
pharmaceutical companies to make vaccines later purchased almost exclusively
6 Indonesia, WHO to End Bird Flu Dispute, NEWSMAX, Mar. 1, 2007, http://archive.news
max.com/archives/articles/2007/3/1/1 30515.shtml.
' Bryan Walsh, Indonesia's Bird Flu Showdown, TIME, May 10, 2007, http://www.time.
com/timeihealth/article/0,8599,1619229,00.html. A seed strain is the particular viral strain
selected to form the basis of the vaccine. Gigi Kwik Gronvall & Luciana L. Borio, Removing
Barriers to Global Pandemic Influenza Vaccination, 4 BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM:
BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, PRACTICE & SCI. 168, 172 (2006), available at http://www.lieberton
line.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1089/bsp.2006.4.168. The effectiveness of the vaccine turns on
selecting the correct seed strain. Id. The WHO Global Influenza Surveillance Network monitors
emerging influenza strains across the globe, determines which strains are most likely to cause
illness, and makes recommendations to vaccine manufacturers about which strains should be
included in the seed strain for a particular year. Id.
8 "Viral sovereignty" is the idea that each nation has sovereign property rights over viral
strains found within its borders. See, e.g., Richard Holbrooke & Laurie Garrett, 'Sovereignty'
That Risks Global Health, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 2008, at B7 (explaining the concept of viral
sovereignty and arguing that refusing to share viral strains with international scientific
community is morally reprehensible).
9 Donald G. McNeil Jr., Indonesia May Sell, Not Give, Bird Flu Virus to Scientists, N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 7, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/07/world/asia/07birdflu.html.
10 Indonesia to Stop Sharing Bird Flu Samples, REUTERS, Feb. 6, 2007, http://uk.reuters.
com/article/idUKJAK17040720070206.
11 See Walsh, supra note 7 (stating that poor nations provide samples but often cannot afford
to purchase vaccines, and are likely to be the last to receive vaccines during public health
emergencies).
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by developed countries. 2 In addition to developed nations, the pharmaceutical
industry also benefits immensely from the existing vaccine distribution system.
For example, sales of the influenza vaccine alone generate revenue of
approximately $2 billion per year for the pharmaceutical industry. 3 As a
result of their mutually beneficial relationship, neither developed countries nor
vaccine manufacturers have much of an incentive to change the status quo.
In support of her nation's decision to deviate from international norms,
Indonesian Health Minister Siti Fadilah Supari said the Indonesian government
withheld its H5N 1 samples from the WHO to entice the global community to
create a system that would provide benefits to countries that contribute to
vaccine development. 4
After a months-long standoff, the WHO resolved the conflict by promising
Indonesian officials that the H5N1 samples would not be given to
pharmaceutical companies without the Indonesian government's permission. 5
As part of the settlement, Indonesia agreed to resume sharing samples
collected from newly discovered H5N1 influenza outbreaks. 6 On May 30,
2007, the World Health Assembly adopted a resolution among its member
states to share viral strains. 7 As part of this resolution, the WHO agreed to
"assess and develop potential mechanisms, including Material Transfer
Agreements, that could promote equitable distribution and availability of
pandemic influenza vaccines developed and produced from these viruses. '"8
12 Id.
" John Lauerman & Karima Anjani, Indonesia Upsets Flu Vaccine System, Demands Glaxo,
Sanofi Pay, BLOOMBERG, Apr. 6, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601080
&sid=a.lri7b.Jobo&refer=asia.
"4 WHO at Odds with Indonesia over Bird Flu, WASH. TIMEs, Apr. 22, 2008, http://www.
washingtontimes.com/news/2008/apr/22/who-at-odds-with-indonesia-over-bird-flu/?page=l.
"5 Indonesia, WHO to End Bird Flu Dispute, supra note 6.
16 Id.
"7 Press Release, World Health Organization, Agreement Reached on Influenza Virus
Sharing, Intellectual Property (May 23, 2007), available at http://www.who.int/mediacentre/
news/releases/2007/wha02/en/index.html.
'8 Press Release, Joint Statement from the Ministry of Health, Indonesia and the World
Health Organization, Sharing of Avian Influenza Viruses and Pandemic Vaccine Production
(Feb. 16, 2007), available at http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2007/sO2/en/
index.html. A Material Transfer Agreement is a contract that pertains to the transfer of research
materials, including biological samples, when the recipient intends to use the materials to
conduct its own research. See, e.g., A Quick Guide to Material Transfer Agreements at UC
Berkley, http://www.spo.berkeley.edu/guide/mtaquick.html (last visited June 20, 2010). The
Material Transfer Agreement defines the legal rights of the donor and the recipient regarding the
materials and any discoveries stemming from the original materials. Id.
[Vol. 38:717
WHO'S VIRUS IS IT ANYWAY?
Through a proposed Material Transfer Agreement, Indonesia aimed to retain
sovereign rights over the donated viral strains, the right to receive the seed
virus at no cost, and the right to participate in research and receive
acknowledgement for its valuable contributions to the WHO's viral sharing
program. 19
This Note will demonstrate why the WHO must prevent member states
from following Indonesia's lead in withholding samples of potentially
catastrophic diseases. Specifically, this Note argues that the WHO must offer
positive incentives so developing countries will have a compelling reason to
share samples of newly discovered viruses with the international scientific and
health communities.
In order to better appreciate the need for a change in the current system,
Part II of this Note will provide background information on both the WHO and
the International Health Regulations. Part III will provide a brief history of
pandemic influenza and will discuss why health experts feared in 2007 that
avian influenza would be the next deadly global pandemic. Part IV will
propose solutions to prevent countries from withholding viral samples in the
future, which include amending the International Health Regulations, imposing
economic sanctions against non-compliant countries, or creating a system that
provides developing countries with positive incentives for sharing viral
samples.
II. BACKGROUND ON THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION AND THE
INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS
A. World Health Organization
The United Nations established the WHO on April 7, 1948.20 It has 193
member states and is governed by the World Health Assembly.2 The
constitution of the WHO grants the organization the power to adopt treaties
19 See Indonesia Says No to Bird Flu Sharing, REUTERS, Nov. 26,2007, http://www.reuters.
com/article/idUSJAK7412120071126 (describing Indonesian goals in securing a Materials
Transfer Agreement).
20 World Health Organization, History ofWHO, http://www.who.intabout/history/en/index.
html (last visited June 20, 2010).
21 World Health Organization, Countries, http://www.who.int/countries/en (last visited
June 20, 2010).
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and regulations that can become "binding" on member states.22 However,
because each member state is free to either explicitly reject the treaty or
regulation or accept it with reservations,23 it has been challenging for the WHO
to implement an effective set of guidelines that comprehensively deals with
emerging threats to global health.24 As a result of this type of governing
structure, the WHO has rarely exercised its formal legislative powers and has
been criticized by leading scholars for not taking sufficient steps to prevent the
spread of communicable diseases, especially in developing nations.25
B. International Health Regulations
One of the rare occasions where the WHO exercised its power to
promulgate rules was in 1951 when it adopted the International Sanitary
Regulations.26 However, because the WHO had no enforcement capabilities
at the time, many countries simply ignored its disease-reporting requirements.27
To combat these problems and provide a more formal framework, the WHO
adopted the International Health Regulations in 1969 (the 1969 Regulations).28
The 1969 Regulations were the first source of international law primarily
concerned with preventing the spread of communicable diseases to protect
global health. 29
Compared with the International Sanitary Regulations, the 1969
Regulations were a step in the right direction toward preventing the spread of
infectious diseases; they provided more guidance to member states about what
measures to follow in the event of an outbreak.30 However, they were still
22 David Bishop, Note, Lessonsfrom SARS: Why the WHO Must Provide Greater Economic
Incentives for Countries to Comply with International Health Regulations, 36 GEO. J. INT'L
L. 1173, 1187 (2005).
23 Lawrence 0. Gostin, Meeting Basic Survival Needs of the World's Least Healthy People:
Toward a Framework Convention on Global Health, 96 GEO. L.J. 331, 376 (2008).
24 Id. at 376-77.
25 Id. at 377-78.
26 David P. Fidler, From International Sanitary Conventions to Global Health Security: The
New International Health Regulations, 4 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 325, 327-28 (2005).
27 Timothy J. Miano, Note, Understanding and Applying International Infectious Disease
Law: UN. Regulations During an H5NI Avian Flu Epidemic, 6 CHI.-KENT J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 26, 29 (2006).
28 Allyn L. Taylor, Controlling the Global Spread of Infectious Diseases: Toward a
ReinforcedRolefor the International Health Regulations, 33 Hous. L. REv. 1327, 1341 (1997).
29 Bishop, supra note 22, at 1188.
30 See Taylor, supra note 28, at 1343-44 (discussing the obligations placed on member states
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unable to fully combat the spread of infectious diseases.3 For example, the
1969 Regulations only monitored six infectious diseases: smallpox, cholera,
typhus, yellow fever, relapsing fever, and the plague.32 Moreover, developing
nations often did not have sufficient financial resources to invest in the
technology necessary to detect infectious-disease outbreaks, and many
developed nations failed to disclose them for fear of negative economic
consequences-i.e., a reduction in trade or tourism.33 As a result of the narrow
scope of the 1969 Regulations and the detection and reporting problems, the
world was left vulnerable to many diseases, including pandemic influenza.
In response to these problems, the World Health Assembly revised the
International Health Regulations in 2005 to provide a more comprehensive
structure for addressing global health challenges.34 The revised International
Health Regulations seek to ensure "their relevance and applicability for many
years to come even in the face of the continued evolution of diseases and of the
factors determining their emergence and transmission."35 A major difference
between the old and new International Health Regulations is that the 2005
Regulations afford member states less discretion in determining whether to
report an outbreak of a disease to the WHO.
The 2005 Regulations apply to all communicable and non-communicable
public health emergencies of international concern.36 The 2005 Regulations
define a public health emergency of international concern as "an extraordinary
event which is determined ... (i) to constitute a public health threat risk to
other States through the international spread of disease and (ii) to potentially
by the 1969 Regulations).
a" Fidler, supra note 26, at 336.
32 World Health Organization, Frequently Asked Questions About the International Health
Regulations (2005), http://www.who.int/ihr/howtheywork/faq/en/index.html#faq0 1 (last visited
June 20, 2010).
33 Miano, supra note 27, at 31.
3' Arielle Silver, Note, Obstacles to Complying with the World Health Organization's 2005
International Health Regulations, 26 WIS. INT'L L.J. 229, 232 (2008). The 2005 Regulations
are an attempt to account for the recent changes in economics, politics, and technology that have
forced the international community to take a comprehensive approach to public health
governance. Eric Mack, The World Health Organization's New International Health
Regulations: Incursion on State Sovereignty and Ill-Fated Response to Global Health Issues,
7 CI. J. INT'L L. 365, 366 (2006).
31 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS 2 (2d ed. 2005),
available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2008/9789241580410 eng.pdf.
36 Id. art. 2.
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require a coordinated international response., 37  The 2005 Regulations
improved international efforts to prevent the spread of infectious diseases.
38
One way the WHO and the 2005 Regulations attempt to control the spread
of viruses like H5N1 avian influenza is by requiring member states to use a
"decision tree" to assess whether a disease constitutes a public health
emergency.39 A "decision tree" contains three paths, and each path lays out a
different course of treatment and reporting requirements for the three
categories of diseases: (1) known diseases with serious outbreaks that occur
without warning; (2) known diseases capable of developing into a public
health emergencies; and (3) unknown or potential health threats.4" Member
states must report to the WHO any disease outbreak that falls into the first
category, and may need to report an outbreak that falls under the second or
third categories after weighing the severity of the illness, the likelihood of the
outbreak spreading to other countries, and the possible impact on travel and
trade.4
Furthermore, a provision was added to the 2005 Regulations that gives the
Director-General of the WHO the authority to decide whether a "public health
emergency of international concern" exists, even if the member state affected
by the outbreak makes a contrary determination.42 While the new provision
appears to give the WHO more supervision over the decisions of member
states, the WHO suffers from a weak governance structure.43 Therefore, other
than the WHO exerting political pressure, little can be done to mandate
compliance with the International Health Regulations.' Thus, it is essential
that the WHO develop a system that provides positive incentives so that
developing countries share samples of newly discovered infectious diseases in
a timely manner.
7 Id. art. 1.
38 Silver, supra note 34, at 230.
3 World Health Assembly [WHA], Revision of the International Health Regulations, Res.
WHA58.3, Annex 2 (May 23,2005), available athttp://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdffiles/WHA
58/WHA58_3-en.pdf.
40 Miano, supra note 27, at 37.
41 Id.
42 See Aoki, supra note 30, at 551 (discussing the increased power of the Director-General
under the 2005 Regulations).
43 Bishop, supra note 22, at 1197.
44 Id.
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Ill. BACKGROUND ON PANDEMIC INFLUENZA AND THE H5Nl
AVIAN INFLUENZA VIRUS
A. Pandemic Influenza
Before the recent Swine Flu pandemic, the world has faced the
consequences of three influenza pandemics since 1900 and has been threatened
by numerous infectious diseases.45 Three conditions must exist for an
influenza pandemic to occur: the virus must be capable of causing sickness in
humans, the population must have little or no pre-existing immunity to the
virus, and it must be capable of easily spreading among people.46
The first of the deadliest influenza pandemics, called the Spanish Flu,
occurred in 1918.4 The 1918 influenza virus likely originated in the United
States, and in less than two years, it spread across the globe in three waves.48
It is estimated that more than one billion people worldwide were infected
between 1918 and 1919, with twenty million to forty million deaths attributed
to the pandemic.49
The second influenza pandemic, called the Asian Flu, emerged in February
of 1957."o In response to the threat of a deadly outbreak, public health officials
in the United States conducted vigilant surveillance and rapidly vaccinated its
citizens.5 Although not as widespread as the 1918 Spanish Flu, the Asian Flu
claimed the lives of nearly 70,000 people in the United States alone. 2 The
" Joseph Nicosia III, Student Article, Avian Flu: The Consumer Costs of Preparing for
Global Pandemic, 18 LOY. CONSUMER L. REv. 479, 480 (2006).
46 Avian Influenza-Are We Prepared?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations,
109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Julie Gerberding, Director, Ctrs. For Disease Control &
Prevention), available at http://foreign.senate.gov/hearings/2005/hrg051109a.html.
47 See, e.g., N. Pieter M. O'Leary, Cock-A-Doodle-Doo: Pandemic Avian Influenza and the
Legal Preparation and Consequences ofan H5NI Influenza Outbreak, 16 HEALTH MATRIX 511,
519-20 (2006) (providing an excellent discussion of the 1918 influenza pandemic).
48 See JOHN M. BARRY, THE GREAT INFLUENZA 1-5 (2005) (discussing the devastating
consequences of the 1918 influenza pandemic). "Influenza killed more people in a year than the
Black Death of the Middle Ages killed in a century; it killed more people in [its first] twenty-four
weeks than AIDS has killed in twenty-four years." Id. at 5.
'9 N. Pieter M. O'Leary, Combating Nature's Insurgency: Tamiflu and Vaccination in the
Fight Against Avian Influenza, 10 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 469, 471 (2006).
s Nicosia, supra note 45, at 481.
5 Id.
52 Id.
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mildest of the three pandemics, the Hong Kong Flu, occurred in 1968 and
claimed the lives of approximately 33,800 people in the United States.53
Due to the increased accessibility of air travel, people and infectious
diseases are able to travel more rapidly now than in years past, making it
increasingly difficult to contain an outbreak. 4 Before discussing the impact
of a potential avian influenza pandemic, however, it is important to have a
basic understanding of the history of the disease. There is a growing
consensus in the scientific community that the 1918 influenza virus and current
strains of the H5N1 avian influenza virus are similar in several respects."
B. H5N1 Avian Influenza
Avian influenza is caused by a type-A strain of the influenza virus and is
carried primarily by migratory birds.56 In addition, the international
distribution of poultry products and an increase in foreign travel have
contributed to the spread of the virus.57 As a result, avian influenza has been
detected in many countries around the world, including Germany, France, Iraq,
Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Nigeria, and India.58
Although avian influenza usually affects only the bird population, the first
known cases of bird-to-human infection were found in Hong Kong in 1997 and
involved the H5N 1 strain. 9 The Hong Kong government promptly ordered the
53 Id.
4 Bishop, supra note 22, at 1178.
5 See Charles Piller, Killer 1918 Flu Gives Clues to New Virus, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 6, 2005,
at Al, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2005/oct/O6/science/sci-flu6 (highlighting that
mutations of current avian influenza virus are similar to the genetic structure of the virus that
caused the 1918 pandemic).
56 World Health Organization, Avian Influenza ("Bird Flu") (Feb. 2006), http://www.who.
int/mediacentre/factsheets/avianinfluenza/en/ [hereinafter Avian Influenza Fact Sheet].
" Lawrence 0. Gostin & Benjamin E. Berkman, Pandemic Influenza: Ethics, Law, and the
Public's Health, 59 ADMIN. L. REv. 121, 123 (2007).
58 Id.
59 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WHO CONSULTATION ON PRIORITY PUBuC HEALTH
INTERVENTIONS BEFORE AND DURING AN INFLUENZA PANDEMIC 1 (2004), available at http://
www.who.int/csr/disease/avian-influenza/en/final.pdf Many people suffering from the H5NI
virus complain of symptoms such as fever, cough, shortness of breath, and diarrhea. O'Leary,
supra note 49, at 473. Approximately forty-eight to ninety-six hours pass between infection and
the onset of symptoms. Id.
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slaughter of 1.5 million birds6" to protect the public from the threat of a global
health crisis.
The outbreak of avian influenza in Hong Kong made authorities keenly
aware of the need for an H5N1 vaccine. In 2004, WHO laboratories isolated
the H5N1 virus samples obtained from two Vietnamese citizens infected with
the disease, resulting in a major breakthrough in the development of an avian
influenza vaccine.6 In March 2005, a branch of the National Institutes of
Health began the first human trials of the vaccine prototype in the U.S.
62
Prior to 2005, almost all cases of humans infected by H5N1 influenza were
thought to have resulted from direct contact with diseased birds.63 In
early 2005, however, scientists suggested H5N1 had acquired the ability to be
transmitted from person-to-person, not merely from bird-to-human. 4
Fortunately, current strains of avian influenza have not yet demonstrated the
capability of sustained transmission between humans.65 Even though H5N1
avian influenza has not yet mutated into an easily transmissible form, it has
already killed at least 186 people across the globe, including seventy-seven
people in Indonesia.66 If the H5Nl virus continues to evolve though adaptive
mutation, it could become highly transmissible between humans, which would
likely lead to a pandemic outbreak with the potential to cause widespread
illness and death.67 For example, if an avian influenza pandemic were to hit
the United States, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has
estimated that more than 200,000 Americans would die and more than 700,000
would require hospitalization.68 If a H5NI pandemic could have such a
devastating effect on the population of a developed country that already has a
sophisticated healthcare system in place, imagine the toll the same pandemic
would likely have on the populations of some of the world's poorest countries
who do not have access to such resources.
6 O'Leary, supra note 47, at 517.
61 O'Leary, supra note 49, at 479.
62 Id.
63 Avian Influenza - Are We Prepared?, supra note 46.
Charles Piller, Bird Flu Spate Signals Easier Transmission, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1,2005, at
A3, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2005/feb/O1/science/sci-birdflul.
65 Gostin & Berkman, supra note 57, at 124.
' Bhattacharya, supra note 5, at 588.
67 Id.
6' Nicosia, supra note 45, at 484.
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Not only would an avian influenza pandemic cause many deaths, it would
also have severe economic consequences to the global economy. Recent avian
influenza outbreaks have adversely affected employment and have reduced the
profitability of the poultry industry as hundreds of millions of domesticated
birds have been killed or died as the result of infection.69 It is estimated that
the 1997 avian influenza outbreak cost Asia as much as $10 billion in direct
economic losses. 70 The economies in developed countries, like the United
States, could see a drop in gross domestic product by as much as 5% if one of
these outbreaks turns into a more widespread pandemic.7' Therefore, given the
enormous potential destruction that could be caused by such a pandemic, it is
critical that the WHO be allowed access to all samples of H5N1 in a timely
manner.
C. The Need to Monitor Newly Discovered H5NJ Strains
With the real threat of an emerging avian influenza pandemic, the ability
of the international scientific community to control the spread of the disease
by developing an effective vaccine is heavily dependent on access to all newly
discovered strains ofH5Nl.7 Without access to newly discovered H5NI viral
strains, scientists cannot assess whether the H5N1 virus has mutated into a
form that is easily passed from person-to-person, which would signal the
beginning stages of a global pandemic.73
Furthermore, avian influenza vaccine research and development is an
ongoing process, and in the event of a global health emergency, the vaccine
must closely match the specific strain of H5Nl that causes the pandemic in
order to be effective. 74 The earlier the pandemic strain of the H5N1 virus is
identified and made available for vaccine production, the sooner the
populations that are most at risk can begin to receive life-saving protection
from the disease.
69 Id.
70 Gostin & Berkman, supra note 57, at 126.
71 Id.
72 Avian Influenza -Are We Prepared?, supra note 46. It takes approximately six months
to produce a new flu vaccine. O'Leary, supra note 47, at 542.
71 See Gostin & Berkman, supra note 57, at 133 (discussing the need for easy access to
newly discovered H5N1 viral strains).
' O'Leary, supra note 49, at 481.
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Although Indonesia's withholding of samples from the WHO was an
extreme departure from established international norms, it drew attention to the
inequitable viral sharing program that is the status quo: samples of infectious
diseases are provided by developing countries in order to produce vaccines to
protect the citizens of developed countries. Indonesia argued that because it
had been repeatedly neglected by the WHO's viral sharing program in the past,
it had no choice but to enter into its own private agreement with Baxter
Healthcare. Some critics of the WHO's viral sharing program agree that "poor
developing nations are often priced out of needed medicines, and they're likely
to be the last in line for vaccine during a pandemic."
Thus, in order to ensure that the scientific community has access to newly
discovered H5N1 strains, it is important for the WHO to motivate developing
countries to turn over samples of diseases discovered within their borders. The
best way to provide this motivation is to develop a system that provides
incentives that are comparable to the benefits that developing countries would
receive if they were able to enter into exclusive private agreements with
vaccine manufacturers. If such a system were developed, member states would
not have a valid justification for withholding viral samples from the
international community. This Note argues that the WHO must take
affirmative steps to prevent other countries from following Indonesia's course
of action in order to adequately protect the health of the global society. This
Note will now propose and examine potential solutions to address this
international dilemma.
IV. SOLUTIONS TO PREVENT DEVELOPING COUNTRIES FROM
WITHHOLDING VIRAL SAMPLES
A. Revising the International Health Regulations
A potential solution for preventing developing countries from withholding
viral samples would be to re-word the International Health Regulations to
explicitly require member states to turn over all sample strains of highly
infectious diseases, such as H5NI, to the WHO. This would help prevent
countries such as Indonesia from relying on ambiguities within the Regulations
to support their argument that they are not required to share samples with the
2010]
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global scientific community.75 Furthermore, this proposed course of action
could be implemented quickly, and without any great expense to the WHO.
While rewording the International Health Regulations to explicitly require
member states to share viral samples might be an appropriate legal solution to
the problem, it might not be a practical solution. As previously discussed,
enforcement of the 2005 Regulations continues to be a problem. Under the
current Regulations there is no authoritative international body to enforce the
regulations,76 and states are unlikely to limit their sovereignty by granting the
WHO more power than it currently has. Even if countries fully accept the
changes to the International Health Regulations, compliance with the
Regulations only continues as long as it remains beneficial to the member
state.77
For developing countries such as Indonesia, the benefits of complying with
the International Health Regulations are often outweighed by the costs. For
example, the WHO does not provide developing nations with funding to create
the public health infrastructure necessary to comply with the 2005
Regulations.78 According to international law scholar David Fidler, "[tihe new
IHR leave unanswered... how many States ... with weak or nonexistent
public health systems will comply with their core-capacity obligations. The
revised Regulations contain no obligations on State Parties to provide financial
or technical resources to help developing and least-developed countries
[comply with the Regulations]." 79
Thus, amending the International Health Regulations to explicitly require
member states to share samples of newly discovered viruses would likely have
little effect on solving the problem. Historically, the WHO has relied on good-
faith efforts by its member states and the threat of international political and
economic pressure to encourage compliance.8" Indonesia's actions
demonstrate that relying on the good-faith compliance efforts of member states
is not sufficient, especially in the face of a global avian influenza pandemic.
'5 See Bishop, supra note 22, at 1196-97 (noting that under the International Health
Regulations it is easy for a country to justify nondisclosure by not considering the health issue
one of "international concern").
76 Id. at 1193.
77 See Mack, supra note 34, at 366 (discussing the possible collision between state
sovereignty and IHR).
7 Miano, supra note 27, at 54.
7" Fidler, supra note 26, at 374.
" Silver, supra note 34, at 244.
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To prevent developing countries from following Indonesia's course of
conduct, the WHO needs to address the underlying reasons developing nations
may choose to withhold samples and enter into exclusive agreements with
pharmaceutical companies. Merely revising the 2005 Regulations to explicitly
require member states to transfer all viral samples, without addressing the
underlying issues, will have a limited impact on preventing a global
pandemic." It would be more effective to provide incentives to encourage
member states to share viral samples with the international community. The
remainder of this Note will discuss whether the WHO should pursue this
course of action.
B. Economic Sanctions
Another possible way to prevent developing countries from withholding
viral samples would be to formally sanction non-compliant member states by
imposing monetary penalties for violations. Such punishment would be
justified because willful violations of the International Health Regulations
endanger the entire global community. Economic sanctions for violations
would also provide an incentive for non-compliant member states to quickly
conform their conduct to the International Health Regulations in order to avoid
additional penalties. Further, substantial economic sanctions could deter other
member states from acting in a similar fashion.
However, imposing monetary penalties on non-compliant member states is
not the best solution to this problem. First, while Indonesia's actions may
appear morally reprehensible from the standpoint that they increase the risk of
an ineffective response in the event of a deadly H5N I influenza pandemic,
Indonesia was most likely acting to protect the health of its citizens because it
was being neglected by the existing vaccine distribution system. From
Indonesia's perspective, it would not be fair to punish the country for taking
measures to safeguard the health of its own citizens. Furthermore, imposing
monetary penalties would be largely ineffective because of the inability to
collect fines from impoverished nations. Without a way for the WHO to force
compliance with the International Health Regulations, there is a substantial
risk that developing nations would simply ignore the fines and continue to
withhold samples.
"' Bishop, supra note 22, at 1175.
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Finally, imposing monetary sanctions against non-compliant member states
would be a difficult policy for the WHO to implement. The WHO would have
to choose whether to vest the power to impose sanctions for non-compliance
in an individual, such as the Director-General, or whether this decision would
be better made by a full vote of all member states. In addition, detecting subtle
violations would be difficult in many cases and intrusive investigations might
invade the national security interests of member states. In any event, the
behavior of member states would have to be closely monitored by the WHO
to make such a policy effective. Such monitoring would likely be expensive
because an additional administrative body would have to be established to
carry out surveillance to ensure member state compliance. Opponents of
economic sanctions argue that this money would be better spent improving the
healthcare systems of developing nations rather than on implementing a
micromanagement program.82
Other economic sanctions that could be used to force compliance include
trade and travel restrictions. However, like monetary penalties, travel and
trade restrictions could have devastating effects on many countries that are
already severely impoverished, and may only produce minimal results.83
Imposing economic sanctions on developing countries would likely have the
greatest impact on the poorest citizens who might lose their livelihood as a
result of the trade restrictions. Further, it would simply be unfair to punish the
citizens of a member state that has chosen to violate the International Health
Regulations; often the poor have no political influence over their government's
decisions. For these reasons, the WHO should not formulate a system of
economic sanctions to encourage member states to turn over their samples.
C. Economic Incentives
In order to guard against a future influenza pandemic, the WHO must offer
economic incentives so developing countries such as Indonesia will have
compelling reasons to share samples of newly discovered viruses and to
82 See Lawrence 0. Gostin & Robert Archer, The Duty of States to Assist Other States in
Need: Ethics, Human Rights, andInternationalLaw, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 526,530-31 (2007)
(arguing that it is in the interest of developed nations to help developing countries improve their
"public health infrastructures").
83 See Bishop, supra note 22, at 1204 (arguing that placing trade sanctions on non-compliant
member states would result in deadweight loss and adverse political consequences).
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comply with the International Health Regulations." The WHO could possibly
provide some form of intellectual property protection to developing countries
in exchange for access to samples collected from infectious disease outbreaks,
directly pay member states in exchange for their samples, adopt provisions that
entitle compliant member states to a share of profits made by pharmaceutical
companies from selling vaccines developed from their shared samples, or
ensure that developing nations are allocated an equitable share of any vaccines
made from donated viral samples. Each of these incentives has strengths and
weaknesses that must be evaluated by the WHO before reaching a decision.
1. Intellectual Property Rights
Some scholars say member states that share viral samples of newly
discovered pathogens should be granted intellectual property rights to the
genetic structure of the disease."5 Providing intellectual property protection for
newly discovered viral strains would likely encourage member states to invest
the time, energy, and money to discover new forms of viruses, which could be
used by pharmaceutical companies to make vaccines. Furthermore, adopting
a system to provide intellectual property rights to the first country that files a
claim with the WHO would likely give member states an incentive to turn over
samples of viruses as soon as they are discovered.
If it were possible for the WHO to grant member states some form of
intellectual property rights to newly discovered viral strains, a framework
similar to the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants
(UPOV) could be potentially adopted. 6 UPOV was established in 1961 by the
International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties in Plants87 (the
UPOV Convention). In short, the UPOV Convention requires countries that
have ratified the treaty to protect indigenous plant varieties, including those
" See Gostin, supra note 23, at 335 (arguing that international law must create incentives
for developing nations to improve the health of their citizens).
8 See Gostin & Berkman, supra note 57, at 133 (discussing the need for international
coordination to prevent countries from keeping health information secret due to intellectual
property concerns).
86 See INT'L UNION FOR THE PROTECTION OFNEW VARIETIES OF PLANTS [UPOV], WHAT IT
Is, WHAT IT DOES (2009) [hereinafter UPOV, WHAT IT IS, WHAT IT DOES], available at http://
www.upov.int/export/sites/upov/en/about/pdf/pub437.pdf. The UPOV is an intergovernmental
organization established in 1961 to provide intellectual property protection to plant breeders. Id.
87 International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties in Plant, Dec. 2, 1961, 33
U.S.T. 2703, 815 U.N.T.S. 89.
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that have a natural source of variation."8 A plant variety is eligible for
protection under the UPOV Convention only if it is new, distinct from existing
varieties, homogenous or uniform, and stable. 9 If a newly discovered plant
variety meets these requirements, it is listed in an international register so that
others will know that the plant variety is protected.90 Once the plant is
protected, others wishing to market the plant commercially must obtain prior
authorization from the breeder. 9' In 1991, the UPOV Convention was
amended to permit scientific research on protected plant varieties as long as
the research is not used for commercial exploitation.92 Finally, the UPOV
Convention contains a compulsory license provision which allows licenses to
be granted where necessary to protect the public interest.93
A similar system to protect newly discovered viral strains, including strains
ofH5N1 or H IN 1, could in theory provide developing countries like Indonesia
with enough of an incentive to share viral samples with the WHO. The
requirements of novelty and distinctiveness could be adopted to protect certain
viral strains. However, under such a system, many newly discovered strains
of H5Nl might not qualify for protection. H5N1 avian influence, like many
other viruses, has the ability to rapidly mutate and might not be able to fulfill
the stability or homogeneity requirements. In the event that a unique viral
strain does meet the requirements for intellectual property protection, research
and compulsory license exceptions should be included in the governing
provisions of the program. Such a system would likely be beneficial in the
context of H5N1 avian influenza because developing nations that provide
samples of viruses used to produce a commercially marketable vaccine would
receive compensation for their contributions, and scientists would be allowed
to conduct research on evolving H5N 1 strains in order to effectively monitor
for signs of a pandemic. Further, in the event of a pandemic, global health
should take priority over intellectual property rights, and compulsory licenses
should be issued in order to protect global health.
However, there are several drawbacks to adopting such a system. First,
assuming that it is even possible, a form of intellectual property protection for
newly discovered viral strains would result in a complex regulatory scheme
8 UPOV, WHAT IT Is, WHAT IT DOES, supra note 86.
89 Id,
9 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
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due to the amount of new strains that are constantly emerging. Such a
regulatory scheme is bound to be inefficient, which would likely deter vaccine
manufacturers from making life-saving vaccines. Specifically, if
pharmaceutical companies were required to pay a fee to license viral strains
from the WHO, the costs of vaccines would increase. Naturally,
manufacturers would pass along the increase to vaccine purchasers in the form
of higher prices. As a result of the increase in prices, it would likely be even
more difficult for developing countries to afford to purchase vaccines to
protect their citizens from pandemic diseases. Finally, an increased number
of disputes would likely arise between two or more countries that discover
similar strains of H5N1, creating the potential for increased international
litigation and unnecessary friction between competing countries. It appears
that because the costs of some form of intellectual property protection for
newly discovered viruses outweighs the benefits, a better course of action is
for the WHO to utilize a different form of positive economic incentives to
foster compliance with the International Health Regulations.
2. Monetary Payments
Another way the WHO could prevent countries such as Indonesia from
withholding viral samples of newly discovered diseases would be to make
direct payments to member states for sharing the samples with the international
community. Not only would direct monetary payments provide a strong
incentive for member states to meet their obligations to the international
community, but such a system would offer other benefits as well. First, a
system of monetary rewards would provide much-needed funding for
improving the basic healthcare systems of developing nations. This type of
system is desirable because the well-being of the world's unhealthiest people
will be improved with an increased investment in the health infrastructure of
developing nations.
Second, providing monetary incentives to member states for sharing
samples with the WHO addresses the concern of developing nations, such as
Indonesia, that feel it is unfair to give up their samples and receive nothing in
return. Through a system of monetary compensation for access to samples of
newly discovered diseases, member states would actually receive something
tangible in return for their compliance efforts. Member states could then use
these payments to fund other development areas, including healthcare
infrastructure advancements.
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However, one can easily imagine problems that might occur if the WHO
were to pay developing nations for access to samples of unique viral strains.
One of the first problems that would need to be resolved would be determining
who would fund such a system, and how much each country should contribute.
One may assume that the burden would fall on wealthy, developed nations
because they presumably have the most money to spend on pandemic
preparedness measures. However, given the severe downturn in the global
economy, many developed nations may not see the benefits of establishing and
contributing to such a pay-for-performance system when there may be more
pressing matters at hand. It would likely be easier to convince developed
nations to fund such a program if they were to receive guarantees that their
contributions would be spent on healthcare infrastructure in developing
nations. However, it might be difficult to ensure funds given to developing
nations would actually be used to improve healthcare rather than for other
purposes.
Secondly, even if a payment system were established, it would likely be a
formidable challenge to determine which member states are eligible to receive
funds and how much they would be entitled to receive for their compliance
efforts. With finite resources, the WHO may be put in the awkward position
of determining which samples are worth "buying" and which ones are not.
Furthermore, it would likely be difficult to determine how much compensation
to provide member states for sharing samples of diseases. Thus, a pay-for-
performance system that provides direct funding for access to samples of
newly discovered diseases may lead to allegations by some member states of
arbitrariness and favoritism in the WHO. Also, such a system might become
susceptible to manipulation by rogue states or terrorist groups who could use
samples of deadly pathogens to extort money from the WHO by threatening to
use them in acts of biological terrorism.
Furthermore, in order to motivate member states, the monetary incentives
would have to be significant; thus, the WHO would have to be prepared to pay
a substantial amount for access to newly discovered viral samples. Since such
a proposal is not likely to be embraced by a majority of member states, the
WHO should look to other forms of economic incentives to induce member
states to comply with the International Health Regulations.
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3. Share of Profits
Because intellectual property protection for newly discovered H5N 1 strains
may be too radical of an idea for many developed member states to accept and
a pay-for-performance framework may prove to be unworkable, perhaps
developing nations should only be entitled to a share of profits derived from
vaccine sales. In contrast to previously mentioned incentives, private
pharmaceutical companies, rather than the WHO, would be responsible for
paying member states for access to their samples. Such a system would
directly compensate developing member states for their contributions to the
international viral sharing program without placing too much of a burden on
the WHO.94 Since the source of funding would come from the private sector
rather than from the public sector, developed nations would be more likely to
embrace such a proposal.
Although most member states would likely support such a proposal, there
are several problems that must be addressed. First, many vaccine
manufacturers would likely oppose this type of incentive. Pharmaceutical
companies are already reluctant to manufacture H5N1 vaccines due to high
investment costs, limited markets, and complex regulatory requirements.95
Pharmaceutical companies may argue by merely providing samples of viral
strains, developing nations do not contribute very much to the development of
the end product and should not be entitled to any profits made from vaccine
sales. Developing countries, on the other hand, are likely to argue that other
industries routinely pay royalties to those who help in the development of a
final product and that vaccine development should be no different. In
response, the pharmaceutical industry may assert that in this context,
manufacturers bear all the risks of developing a particular vaccine, and
therefore, should be entitled to all of the rewards.
A second problem with requiring pharmaceutical companies to pay
countries a share of profits derived from vaccine sales is that such a system
might encourage member states to follow Indonesia's lead and bypass the
WHO altogether. Instead of turning their samples over to a centralized
" However, the World Health Organization would still have to ensure that the
pharmaceutical companies met their obligations to member states. Therefore, some type of
regulatory committee would have to be established to monitor the activities of vaccine
manufacturers.
" Silver, supra note 34, at 250-51.
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international body, a member state may choose to enter into direct negotiations
with vaccine manufacturers, particularly if the private pharmaceutical industry
is willing to pay a premium for access to samples of a particular disease. Such
an arrangement would undermine the authority of the WHO and would lead to
considerable disruption of the international framework for combating the
spread of disease; there would no longer be a centralized comprehensive
international repository of infectious disease samples. Thus, implementing this
type of incentive is also not the best solution.
4. Equitable Access to Vaccines
Rather than enacting a profit-sharing incentive system, the best way to
ensure developing member states will continue to provide viral samples to the
WHO is to ensure that member states receive an equitable share of any
vaccines developed from such samples.96 In addition to being the least
controversial way to provide meaningful incentives for developing nations, this
solution provides multiple benefits. For example, equitable access to vaccines
is of primary importance to developing countries. Developing countries, such
as Indonesia, are more likely to share samples of newly discovered viruses
with the global scientific community if they believe the allocation of vaccines
developed from those samples will be fair.
However, like any type of incentive system, there are downsides to
providing developing nations with equitable access to vaccines. First,
determining exactly what constitutes an "equitable" distribution of
vaccinations could cause considerable disagreement. The WHO would have
to choose between establishing a bright-line rule and determining what is
"equitable" on a case-by-case basis. A bright-line rule might be preferable
because it would provide member states with advanced notice of how many
doses of a particular vaccine they could expect to receive in return for sharing
samples with the WHO. Additionally, a bright-line rule would likely reduce
claims of favoritism or arbitrariness from member states. However, the WHO
might encounter problems when rationing the vaccines because often there are
9 As a condition to allowing vaccine manufacturers to have access to viral samples obtained
from member states, the WHO could insist as part of its contractual agreements with
pharmaceutical companies that the companies sell a certain amount of vaccines back to the WHO
at a reduced price. The WHO could then sell the vaccine to the appropriate developing countries
at the same reduced cost.
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not enough doses of a particular vaccine to inoculate everyone who needs it.97
As a result, developed countries might object to such a system if they fear that
they will not be able to purchase enough vaccines to protect their citizens.
However, if the WHO was able to convince developed nations that one of the
best ways to stop the spread of infectious diseases that originate in developing
countries is to contain them at the source, developed countries might agree to
grant developing nations greater access to certain vaccines. Since the benefits
of an equitable distribution of vaccines appear to substantially outweigh the
arguments against such a system, the WHO should grant developing nations
that contribute viral samples equitable access to vaccines in the event of an
infectious disease outbreak.
V. CONCLUSION
By taking an in-depth look at the stand-off that occurred between Indonesia
and the WHO in 2007, this Note has sought to critically evaluate the World
Health Organization's current viral sharing program. While Indonesia's
actions may not have been contrary to its obligations under the current
International Health Regulations, by withholding samples of H5N 1, Indonesia
increased the risk that scientists would not be able to develop an effective and
timely vaccine to respond to an avian influenza pandemic. Thus, to prevent
developing countries from following Indonesia's lead and entering into private
arrangements with vaccine manufacturers, the WHO must take action
immediately.
To prevent member states from asserting "viral sovereignty" over newly
discovered diseases, the WHO should amend the International Health
Regulations so that member states can no longer rely on ambiguity to justify
their actions. However, due to the weak governance structure of the WHO,
this may not be enough to discourage other countries from acting in a similar
manner.
To effectively prevent member states from asserting "viral sovereignty," the
WHO must also provide incentives for member states to share samples of
newly discovered viruses with the international community. Disincentives will
not be as effective as positive incentives because of detection problems and the
97 See, e.g., Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Current Vaccine Shortages &
Delays, http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/vac-gen/Shortages/default.htm (last visited June 20,2010)
(charting vaccination shortages in the United States).
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risk that developing member states could refuse to pay fines if sanctioned.
Thus, the WHO should offer incentives to reward member states for sharing
samples with the global community. Although the WHO could possibly
provide member states with some form of intellectual property protection for
strains of unique viruses discovered within their borders, this solution is
unworkable with regard to avian influenza because the virus has the potential
to mutate rapidly.
Another option is that in exchange for access to viral samples, the WHO
could either make direct monetary payments to member states or ensure that
pharmaceutical companies give member states a percentage of profits made
from selling vaccines. The former proposal is likely to receive strong
resistance from developed nations who may be unwilling to pay member states
for access to newly discovered samples. On the other hand, pharmaceutical
companies are likely to strongly oppose the latter proposal and may be deterred
from developing vaccines altogether.
Thus, the WHO should ensure that developing nations that contribute
samples have equitable access to vaccines derived from those samples. Such
a proposal is the least controversial and furthers the WHO's underlying
mission of improving health around the world.9" Unless the WHO provides
member states with equitable access to vaccines, developing member states,
such as Indonesia, may be tempted to withhold viral samples of newly
discovered diseases, jeopardizing the health of the global community.
98 See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, CONSTITUrION OF THE WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION, at art. 1 (2006), available at http://www.who.int/govemance/eb/whoconstitut
ionen.pdf (stating the WHO's goal "shall be the attainment by all peoples of the highest
possible level of health").
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